Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 54 | Number 3

Article 2

8-21-2014

The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect's
Home: Does an Empirical Justification Exist for the
Protective Sweep Doctrine?
Illya Lichtenberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Illya Lichtenberg, The Dangers of Warrant Execution in a Suspect's Home: Does an Empirical Justification Exist for the Protective Sweep
Doctrine?, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 623 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

LICHTENBERG FINAL

8/21/2014 4:05 PM

THE DANGERS OF WARRANT EXECUTION IN A
SUSPECT’S HOME: DOES AN EMPIRICAL
JUSTIFICATION EXIST FOR THE PROTECTIVE
SWEEP DOCTRINE?
Illya Lichtenberg*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 623
I. The Fourth Amendment and Dangerous Situations ........................ 625
A. Buie and the Protective Sweep Doctrine .......................... 626
II. Research on Police Dangerousness ................................................ 628
III. Methodology................................................................................. 632
A. Data Source ...................................................................... 633
B. Variables and Definitions ................................................. 634
IV. Data Analysis ............................................................................... 637
A. Process Service................................................................. 638
B. Home ................................................................................ 640
C. Ambush ............................................................................ 641
D. Secured ............................................................................. 641
E. Third Party........................................................................ 642
V. Discussions and Conclusions......................................................... 643

“It is, indeed regrettable that the empirical data on a subject such as
this are sparse, but we need not ignore the data which do exist
1
simply because further refinement would be even more helpful.”

INTRODUCTION
This article studies the felonious killings of police officers while
serving arrest warrants and other legal process. 2 The study seeks to test

* The author is currently an associate professor at Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY.
1. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 n.2 (1997) (commenting on the need for
more data on police victimization).
2. The situations included and excluded from the research are discussed in the
methodology section. See infra Part II.
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the underlying assumptions of the rationale of Maryland v. Buie,3
concerning the dangers of warrant execution. 4 Although the Buie
decision relied on numerous empirically testable assumptions, the crux
of the decision focused on third party attacks against the police after
the principle suspect was securely in custody. 5 Another question is
also examined in the research: Did Buie cause a measurable change on
the rates of felonious police fatalities during the service of arrest
warrants or other legal process that is attributable to the expanded
search ability extended to police? 6
In Buie, the United States Supreme Court extended the search
powers of police when executing a lawful arrest warrant. 7 Specifically,
Buie extended the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion of danger to
the officer to the execution of arrest warrants in private homes. 8 The
Buie Court’s underlying rationale was the execution of an arrest
warrant in a suspect’s home is inherently dangerous 9 and the dangers
are not dispelled when the suspect is in police custody and control.10
The potential danger extends to hypothetical and unknown third parties
that may potentially ambush the police. 11
Part I addresses the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding
dangers to the police. 12 Part II is an overview of the literature on
dangers confronting the police and the little that is known about
warrant execution. 13 Part III discusses the data sources and methods
used in the analysis. 14 Part IV undertakes an analysis of the data to test
the assumptions identified in Part I. 15 Lastly, Part V discusses the
findings and the conclusions of the data analysis. 16

3. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
4. See infra Part VI.
5. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
6. See infra Part VI.
7. Buie, 494 U.S. at 325 (1990).
8. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968)).
9. Id. at 333 (“Moreover, unlike the encounter on the street or along a highway, an inhome arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’ An
ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in
open, more familiar surroundings.”).
10. Id. (“In the instant case, there is an analogous interest of the officers in taking steps
to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is
not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an
attack.”).
11. Id.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DANGEROUS SITUATIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unlawful searches
and seizures by government agents. 17 It requires that all searches and
seizures be reasonable 18 and that all searches and seizures justified by a
warrant be supported by probable cause and numerous other
requirements expressly stated in the Amendment. 19 Until 1968, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require that all
searches and seizures, whether conducted with or without a warrant, be
supported by probable cause. 20 Terry v. Ohio 21 permitted the police to
conduct a limited frisk of suspects for officer safety on a lesser
standard than probable cause. 22 This came to be known as “stop and
frisk” or a “Terry stop.” 23 Although probable cause did not exist, the
police were permitted to undertake searches and seizures on a restricted
basis to protect the officer from potentially violent suspects. 24
In 1983, the Supreme Court extended the Terry standard to motor
vehicle stops. 25 In Michigan v. Long, the police were permitted to
undertake a search of a motor vehicle and its contents for the purpose
of locating weapons that might be used against the officer, despite the
fact that the sole occupant of the vehicle was already under the control
of the police. 26 The general theme of Terry, that policing is an
inherently dangerous occupation, was extended in Long to include
specific situations that are dangerous, 27 namely motor vehicle stops. 28
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”); see John Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the
Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.
20. Id. Certain administrative searches for public health purposes were permitted on
less than probable cause in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). Despite the fact that Terry created a new lesser standard justifying police intrusions
on citizens Fourth Amendment rights, legal scholars have noted skepticism as to whether
this actually resulted in any change in police practices for on street encounters. See Wayne
R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 39, 40–46 (1968).
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. Id. at 30.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
26. Id.
27. The Terry Court, although primarily addressing the general dangerousness of
policing, did acknowledge particular aspects of “on-the-street encounters” that are
dangerous; Terry, 329 U.S. at 18 n.15.
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Maryland v. Buie followed the same general principle, that policing is
dangerous, to the specific situation of executing arrest warrants in the
suspect’s home. 29
A. Buie and the Protective Sweep Doctrine
Jerome Edward Buie was suspected of being involved in an armed
robbery; subsequently, the police secured an arrest warrant for him. 30
The police placed Buie’s home under surveillance and later executed
Buie’s arrest warrant. 31 While the police were executing an arrest
warrant at the house, Buie emerged from the basement and surrendered
without incident. 32 Buie was removed from his home while a detective
continued to sweep Buie’s house for other individuals. 33 During the
protective sweep of the basement, the detective found a red running
suit which was later used as evidence at Buie’s trial. 34
The Supreme Court analyzed the Buie case to determine if the
police were justified in conducting the search of the basement and
seizure of the running suit without probable cause. 35 The Buie Court
held that the search of the basement after Buie’s arrest was unlawful as
a search incident to a lawful arrest. 36 Since Buie had already been
arrested and the basement was not within his wing span, 37 the search
could not be lawful under Chimel v. California. 38 Absent some other
justification, the police were required to possess probable cause to
justify the search 39 and there was no probable cause to search the
28. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047.
29. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33.
30. Id. at 328.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 330 (“The issue in this case is what level of justification the Fourth
Amendment required before Detective Frolich could legally enter the basement to see if
someone else was there.”).
36. Id. at 336 (citing Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (“Affirmance is not required by Chimel v. California, where . . . the justifiable
search incident to an in-house arrest could not extend beyond the arrestee’s person and the
area from within which the arrestee might have obtained a weapon. First, Chimel was
concerned with a full-blown search of the entire house for evidence of the crime for which
the arrest was made, not the more limited intrusion contemplated by a protective sweep.
Second, the justification for the search incident to arrest considered in Chimel was the threat
posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen
third parties in the house.” (citations omitted)).
39. Id. at 332–33 (“Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe Buie
was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the house in
which Buie might be found, however, the search for him was over, and there was no longer
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basement once the arrest was executed fully. 40
The Court entertained the question of what level of justification is
required before the police could lawfully enter the basement to
discover if anyone else was present. 41 The Court analyzed the situation
under the reasonableness test 42 where the interests of the state are
balanced against the suspect’s privacy interests. 43 In arriving at its
conclusion, the Court reviewed two prior cases, Terry v. Ohio and
Michigan v. Long. 44 The Court’s concern in Terry and Long for officer
safety involved dispelling the officer’s concern that the person with
whom they were dealing was not armed or otherwise dangerous.45 The
Court approached the search of the home in the same context. 46 The
concern in Buie was not an immediate known suspect, as in Terry, but
unknown third parties whose presence, or lack thereof, was unknown to
the police. 47
The Court also concluded that the in-house arrest was more
dangerous than the situations in Terry and Long. 48 The basis of this
rationale was an issue of turf—the suspect’s home was his environment
and the officer was at a greater disadvantage than on-the- street where
circumstances are more equal. 49 The Court concluded that the facts of
Buie, the existence of a possibly dangerous third party, were a
sufficient justification to outweigh the intrusion upon Buie’s privacy
interests. 50 The Court thus created a standard that differed from

that particular justification for entering any rooms that had not yet been searched.”).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 331–32.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 333 (“In Terry and Long we were concerned with the immediate interests
of the police officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with whom they
were dealing were not armed, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against them.”).
46. See id.
47. See id. (“[T]he officers [had an interest] in taking steps to assure themselves that
the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other
persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack. The risk of
danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is on-thestreet or roadside investigatory encounter.”).
48. See id.
49. Id. (“Moreover, unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-home
arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’ An ambush in a
confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more
familiar surroundings.”).
50. See id. at 334 (“We are quite sure, however, that the arresting officers are permitted
in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making,
the arrest. That interest is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail.”).
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Chimel because it did not involve the dangerousness of the suspect; 51 it
involved unknown third parties. 52 It differed from Terry because it did
not require individualized suspicion, 53 as the existence of a third party
is not known until the search has been conducted. 54 But the
dangerousness theme underlies the entire rationale behind the Buie
holding: 55 the execution of arrest warrants is a dangerous business, the
danger is not dispelled upon the successful arrest and incapacitation of
the suspect, and third parties continue to pose a serious risk. 56
The Court relied upon the same basic assumption in Terry, Long,
and Buie: policing is a dangerous occupation and there is a great risk of
intentional harm being inflicted on the police in the course of their
duties. 57 Terry created this rationale and Long and Buie relied on it
almost exclusively. 58 In Long and Buie, the Court created situationspecific assumptions concerning specific police activities.59 These
decisions identify specific activities that are uniquely dangerous to the
police and permit the expansion of police discretion and authority to
reduce the likelihood of danger without threatening the integrity of
evidence incidentally obtained in the due course of exercising this
discretion. 60 Buie extended the policing-as-a-dangerous-occupation
rationale further than Terry and Long, as it applied only to potential or
hypothetical dangers that might or could exist rather than potential
threats from existing parties in the flesh. 61 In addition, Buie justified
intrusions into a suspect’s dwelling—a place where the Fourth
Amendment has long been held to provide its greatest protections. 62
II. RESEARCH ON POLICE DANGEROUSNESS
Violence directed towards the police has been the topic of

51. See id. at 336.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 334 (“Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing
a danger to those at the arrest scene.”).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 331 (“The Terry case is most instructive for present purposes.”).
56. Id. at 333.
57. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. “A man’s home is his castle” is a long quoted legal axiom. See Wilson v. Lane,
526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999).
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numerous studies over the past several decades.63 However, the
application of research toward the violent victimization of the police in
a context specific to the Fourth Amendment has only recently been
examined. 64 One finding contradicted Terry’s expressly and implicitly
stated assumptions that policing was a dangerous occupation. 65 This
63. See generally Sean A. Grennan, Findings on the Role of Officer Gender in Violent
Encounters with Citizens, 15 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1987); Rebecca Reviere &
Vernetta D. Young, Mortality of Police Officers: Comparisons by Length of Time on the
Force, 13 AM. J. POLICE 51 (1994); David Konstantin, Homicides of American Law
Enforcement Officers 1978–1980, 1 JUST. Q. 29 (1984); Terry D. Edwards, Felonious
Killings of State Police and Highway Patrol Officers: A Descriptive and Comparative
Evaluation, 14 AM. J. POLICE 89 (1994); Joel Garner & Elizabeth Clemmer, Danger to
Police in Domestic Disturbances—A New Look, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., Nov. 1986; Albert P.
Cardarelli, An Analysis of Police Killed by Criminal Action: 1961–1963, 59 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 447 (1968); Robert E. Little, Cop Killing: A Descriptive
Analysis of the Problem, 7 POLICE STUD. 68 (1984); Charles Moorman, Police Officers
Murdered in California with One Shot: The 1980’s, 24 J. CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990);
Larry Roberts, An Analysis of Fatal Assaults Upon Law Enforcement Officers Which
Occurred in the United States From 1972 Through 1978 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi) (on file with author); John G. Stratton et
al., Police in a Violent Society, 54 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1985); Lawrence W.
Sherman et al., Police Murder in Drug-Related Situations, 1972–1988, in CRIME CONTROL
REP. No. 7 (1989); Max Boylen & Robert Little, Fatal Assaults on United States Law
Enforcement Officers, 63 POLICE J. 61 (1990); David Lester, Predicting Murder Rates of
Police Officers in Urban Areas, 7 POLICE L.Q. 20 (1978); Mitchell B. Chamlin, Conflict
Theory and Police Killings, 10 DEVIANT BEHAV. 353 (1989); Laura A. Wilson & C.
Kenneth Meyer, Violence at the Street Level: Police Casualties and Fatalities, 64 POLICE J.
28 (1990); Freidrich Wenz, Death Anxiety Among Law Enforcement Officers, 7 J. POLICE
SCI. & ADMIN. 230 (1979); Francis Cullen et al., Paradox in Policing: A Note on
Perceptions of Danger, 11 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 457 (1983); James C. Hackler &
Christian T. L. Janssen, Police Killings in Perspective, 27 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 227
(1985); SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, COPS, KILLERS, AND STAYING ALIVE: THE MURDER OF
POLICE OFFICERS IN AMERICA (1986); William Wilbanks, Cops Killed and Cop-Killers: An
Historical Perspective, 13 AM. J. POLICE 31 (1994); L. DYKSTRA, ILLINOIS LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSAULTED OR KILLED: 1972–1982 (1984); FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY: A STUDY OF SELECTED FELONIOUS
KILLINGS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1992); David Lester, A Study of Civiliancaused Murders of Police Officers, 6 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 373 (1978);
MONA MARGARITA, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE (1980); Ruth D. Peterson &
William C. Bailey, Structural Influences on the Killing of Police: A Comparison with
General Homicides, 5 JUST. Q. 207 (1988); Edward F. Davis & Anthony J. Pinizzotto,
Above and Beyond the Call of Duty: Preventing Off-Duty Officer Deaths, 65 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL. No. 4, 1996, at 1; Cindy Clarke & Mark J. Zak, Fatalities to Law
Enforcement Officers and Firefighters, 1992–1997, COMPENSATION & WORKING
CONDITIONS, Summer 1999, at 3–7; JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEPT OF
JUST., POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976–1998: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE
OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS (2001); Candice Batton, Police Murders: An Examination
of Historical Trends in the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers in the United States, 1947 to
1998, 10 HOMICIDE STUD. 79 (2006).
64. See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
65. Illya Lichtenberg, Alisa Smith & Michael Copeland, Terry and Beyond: Testing the
Underlying Assumption of Reasonable Suspicion, 17 TOURO L. REV. 439, 458–59 (2001).
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study, examining the underlying rationale of Terry, compared police
homicide victimization rates to the victimization rates of the general
population, while controlling for the demographic characteristics of age
and sex. 66 The study found that the victimization rates for police were
considerably lower than the demographically controlled population. 67
Another study examined the dangerousness of motor vehicles
stops to the police. 68 Rather than comparing the rates of victimization,
the study utilized a “danger ratio.” 69 The danger ratio controlled for
the frequency of the police activity rather than merely making
comparisons between aggregate numbers. 70 The study found that
roughly ten police officers were victims of felonious killing per year
during motor vehicle stops. 71 Because motor vehicle stop are so
common in general police activities, the likelihood of such
victimization was extremely unlikely. 72 This study examined an
assumption underlying motor vehicle stops in Michigan v. Long and
uncovered evidence in part contradicting the assumption of the inherent
dangers of motor vehicle stops in cases such as Long. 73
Unfortunately, the two studies aimed at examining dangers
inherent to the police in the Fourth Amendment context failed to be
situation specific. The studies examined broadly defined assumptions
of the Terry and Long Courts, but failed to provide more specific
circumstances where a particular police activity is dangerous, as the
reasonableness test requires. 74 The reasonableness test is assessed on a
case specific basis and does not rely on broad-based assumptions only
partially related to the immediate situation in controversy. 75
66. Id.
67. Id. (“Based on this analysis, male police officers are not placed at risk of homicide
victimization, either on or off duty, beyond that which male citizens in a similar age group
face daily. The victimization rates between the two groups are very similar, and in fact it
appears reasonable to conclude that police officers have a lower risk of homicide
victimization than do the aggregate of males in a similar age group. This finding contradicts
the assumption in Terry and its progeny that police face greater risk than the general
population.”).
68. Illya Lichtenberg & Alisa Smith, How Dangerous are Routine Police-Citizen
Traffic Stops?: A Research Note, 29 J. OF CRIM. JUST.419, 419 (2001).
69. Id. at 420–21. The danger ratio was adapted from the research of Joel Garner and
Elizabeth Clemmer. Garner & Clemmer, supra note 63, at 1 (examining the rate of police
victimization while controlling for the frequency of the police activity).
70. Lichtenberg & Smith, supra note 68, at 419.
71. Id.
72. Id. 425–26.
73. Id. 419–20; (specifically referring to Maryland v. Wilson, 591 U.S. 408 (1997) and
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and referring to Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113 (1999)).
74. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990).
75. Id.
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Research relating specifically to the dangers of warrant service is
unavailable. Little research exists on warrants in general, and the little
research that does exist focuses primarily on search warrants. 76 These
studies make no attempt to gauge the inherent dangers of warrant
execution. Their focus is primarily on search warrant applications,
processes, and results, not execution. 77 Although search and arrest
warrant execution may be similar in many regards, they also differ in
material respects. Buie applies to arrest warrants, but it is unclear how
Buie applies to the execution of search warrant. 78 A search warrant
seeks an object while an arrest warrant seeks a person. 79 Thus, it is
unlikely the limited data available on search warrants is of material use
for empirically analyzing the execution of arrest warrants or legal
process generally in a suspect’s home. The absence of any references
to the dangers of search warrant execution in the two studies is telling.
Researchers conducted interviews and observations that could have
uncovered whether serious safety concerns exist; however, the
inference that the interviews did not uncover safety concerns is not
dispositive. 80
Although the empirical research on violence against the police
casts doubts upon parts of the underlying rationale of Terry and
progeny, legal commentators have attempted to draw inferences from
other research, which at least in part lends support to the Court’s
conclusion in Buie. 81 For example, research concludes that suburban
police departments have measurably increased their use of bullet proof
vests; 82 between 1980 and 1990 there has been a seventy-nine percent
increase in juveniles who murder with a gun; 83 and juvenile boys and
girls reported forty-one and twenty-one percent respectively could
obtain a hand gun anytime they wanted. 84 It is unclear how these
assertions have direct application to the service of warrants or legal
76. Richard Van Duizend, L. Paul Sutton & Charlotte A. Carter, The Search Warrant
Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
1968, at 3.171, 3.171–3.172; Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants,
Motions to Suppress, and “Lost Cases”: The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven
Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1034 (1990).
77. Duizend et al., supra note 76, at 3.173–3.178; Uchida & Bynum, supra note 76, at
1058.
78. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.
79. Uchida & Bynum, supra note 76, at 1058 (finding that search warrant execution
lead to an arrest in fifty-four percent of the primary warrants executed).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, Essay: An Essay on the Unexpected Person Factor
in Searches and Seizures, 39 ST. LOUIS L.J. 505 (1995).
82. Id. at 517 n.107.
83. Id. at 517 n.108.
84. Id. at 518 n.109.
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process in the suspect’s home, but legal scholars have advanced
arguments, at least in part based on empirical evidence, as support for
the protective sweep doctrine. 85
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s
assumptions concerning the dangers of policing may be misguided.
Concerning the service of legal process and arrest warrants specifically
at a suspect’s home, there is little evidence to support or refute the Buie
Court’s assumptions concerning the inherent dangers posed by warrant
execution and the unknown third parties who may launch an attack on
the police.
III. METHODOLOGY
The study presented in this article seeks to examine the situationspecific assumptions of the Buie Court’s rationale. 86 As noted earlier,
the Buie decision is based upon the potential dangers presented by
unknown third parties. 87 The data collected for this study provide
sufficient detail to draw conclusions concerning this assumption.
Unlike previous studies testing assumptions of Terry and progeny,
which focused on broad-based assumptions of dangerousness, this
study seeks to examine the five principle assumptions of the Buie
Court. 88 First, the service of process, particularly arrest warrants is
dangerous. 89 Second, the home is more dangerous than the street. 90
Third, ambushes may occur. 91 Fourth, the threat of lethal violence
remains after the primary suspect has been securely placed in
custody. 92 Fifth, this threat of lethal violence arises from unknown
third parties in the home. 93
This Part is split into two subsections.94 The first addresses the
sources of data utilized in the study noting the strengths and limitations
85. See id. at 518.
86. The use of the word “examine” as opposed to “test” was intentional. The data
provide many insights into the variables, but additional data, currently unavailable, is
necessary to test all of the assumptions fully. The missing data is that of the “base rate” data
not available discussed earlier.
87. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990).
88. Id.
89. See infra Part IV.A. The term legal process is defined broadly to include the
service of any process authorized by a judicial officer or being authorized by law. This
includes: arrest and search warrants; temporary restraining orders; civil commitment orders;
a capias; bench warrant; civil judgment execution, or any other similar police activity with
an eye towards inclusion.
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. See infra Part IV.C.
92. See infra Part IV.D.
93. See infra Part IV.E.
94. See infra Part III.
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of the data sources. 95 The second subsection discusses how the
variables in the study were created from the data.96
A. Data Source
The data sources used for the study were derived from Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (“LEOKA”), 97 an annual
publication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 98 The data provided
by LEOKA includes all line of duty deaths of police officers on or off
duty. 99 The data on deaths is separated into two primary categories: 100
accidental killings and felonious killings. 101 In addition to providing
aggregate statistics for the United States and its territories 102 on the
felonious killings of police, the LEOKA provides a narrative summary
description of each felonious killing. 103 LEOKA does not provide any
aggregate statistics on the felonious killings of police officers during
the service of legal process or for warrant service, nor any comparable
situational data. 104 The felonious killings occurring during warrant
execution and other legal process service were derived from the
The
narrative summaries of felonious killings in LEOKA. 105
summaries selected for inclusion in the study were the execution or
service of any legal process. The study construes legal process
liberally to promote inclusion of felonious killings unless the
descriptions clearly fell outside the possible scope of the Buie decision.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting
Section (“UCR”) collects the LEOKA data. 106 The UCR uses three
methods for collecting information on police officers feloniously killed

95. See infra Part III.A.
96. See infra Part III.B.
97. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED (1996) [hereinafter LEOKA].
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 3–5.
101. Id. It should be noted that felonious killings include a definition that is
considerably broader than the traditional measures of murder and non-negligent
manslaughter measured in the Uniform Crime Reports.
102. The geographic scope of LEOKA is broader than the traditional Uniform Crime
Reporting as it includes United States territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and
Puerto Rico. LEOKA also includes United States law enforcement officers killed in other
countries. See id. at 62 tbl.22.
103. Id. at 41–57.
104. The closest classification provided by LEOKA is “arrest situations,” which is very
broad and includes by majority non-warrant initiated arrests.
105. LEOKA compiles a “summary of incidents” resulting in the felonious killing of a
police officer for each year it is published.
106. LEOKA, supra note 97, at 1.
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in the line of duty. 107 First, police agencies participating in the
Uniform Crime Reporting Program notify the UCR of the duty-related
death and provide preliminary data. 108 The respective FBI field
division also reports these incidents in the geographic area where the
police officer was killed. 109 Once reported to the UCR, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance, through the Public Safety Officers Benefits
Program administrator, does a follow up throughout the year. 110 The
UCR considers this threefold reporting mechanism as providing valid
Because of these three data collection
and complete data. 111
procedures, the infrequency in which police are killed feloniously, 112
and the fact that the data provided are from the police on their own
members, 113 suggests the quality of this secondary data source is quite
high in comparison to other measures of criminal victimization. 114 The
single greatest validity threat to the quality of the data is that because
police provide the data on their own membership, there is the real
possibility that the data omits misconduct, violence, or other
questionable behavior by the victim-officer or that an officer
strategically writes the report to mask police deviance. 115
B. Variables and Definitions
Several variables were created from the summary descriptions
provided in LEOKA of police officers feloniously killed during the
execution or service of process. The first variable is the form of
process being served. The second variable identifies the location of
where the fatal incident between the police and the suspect occurred.
The third variable specifies whether the suspect was secured or not
when the felonious killing occurred. The fourth variable identifies
107. Id..
108. Id. (explaining that virtually all police agencies participate in the UCR program).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Lichtenberg et al., supra note 65.
113. LEOKA, supra note 97, at 1.
114. Walter R. Gove et al., Are Uniform Crime Reports a Valid Indicator of Index
Crimes? An Affirmative Answer with Minor Qualifications, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 451 (1985);
Philip J. Cook, The Case of the Missing Victims: Gunshot Woundings in the National Crime
Survey, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1987); Scott Menard, Short Term Trends in
Crime and Delinquency: A comparison of UCR, NCS, and Self-Report Data, 4 JUSTICE Q.
455 (1982); Richard McCleary et al., Uniform Crime Reports as Organizational Outcomes:
Three Times Series Experiments, 29 SOC. PROBS. 361 (1982).
115. Two highly publicized incidents, Waco and Ruby Ridge, are included in the
analysis, which raise suspicions concerning the data’s integrity. For example, in the Ruby
Ridge incident, the man who killed the officer was acquitted. See Harris v. Roderick, 933 F.
Supp. 977 (D. Idaho 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2010).
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whether the felonious killings were the product of an ambush. The
fifth variable indicates whether a third party caused the felonious
killing.
Process: Process describes the intended activity being undertaken
by the police when the felonious killing occurred. These are
categorized into the following classifications: 116
Arrest Warrant: This includes arrest warrants and bench
warrants. 117 The definition also includes felonious killings where the
initial contact between the police and the suspect was based on other
grounds but an active warrant was discovered during the contact or
known to the officer prior to the officer’s death. The police officer was
not required to possess the warrant at the time of the felonious killing;
but only required to have knowledge of its existence. Instances where
the existence of a warrant was unclear, VOPs (Violation of Probations)
and PVs (Parole Violations), were also coded as arrest warrant.
Because Buie applied to arrest warrants, in some analyses a separate
analysis of arrest warrants is conducted in that section.
Search Warrant: This includes all felonious killings where the
police officer was in possession of a search warrant and had the intent
to or was present for the purpose of executing the warrant. In addition,
retaliatory killings after execution of the search warrant were included.
Search and Arrest Warrant: This includes all circumstances where
both an arrest warrant and a search warrant were in the possession of
the police.
Temporary Restraining Order: This includes all cases where the
police went to a residence or other location for the purpose of serving a
temporary or permanent restraining order or similar process.
Involuntary Commitment: This includes all cases where the police
possessed a court order for involuntary commitment or court order for
psychiatric testing to be served on the subject and/or for ordering the
suspect be taken into custody.
Civil Process: This includes all service of a civil nature other than
mental health. This variable could also be defined as any process that
is not criminal or psychiatric in origin.
Third Party: Third party is defined as any person directly
connected to the killing of the police officer who is not the target of the
process. Because search warrants are directed at property and not at
individual people, it was impossible to determine if third parties

116. Abbreviated terms used in the tables follow the form of process in parenthesis.
117. Bench warrants differ from arrest warrants in that bench warrants are for a failure
to appear in court as where arrest warrants are for an actual offense.
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existed, thus this variable was not applied to search warrant killings. 118
Location: The location of the killing was coded as one of five
categories: one indoor and four outdoor. Room refers to any killing
occurring inside a primary residential dwelling. Entrance, indicates
that the killing occurred at any entrance into a structure, including
porches, front doors, and apartment building hallways and staircases.
Forced entry refers to the officer being killed immediately upon forced
entry, generally limited to knock and announce search warrant entries.
Outside, indicates that the killing occurred clearly outside the home,
including the patrol vehicle, yard, and unattached structures to the main
structure. 119 Street refers to killings unconnected to a warrant
execution in the home. This includes encounters originating on the
street, pursuits leading a substantial distance from the home, or
apprehended suspects who later escape or attack the police when away
from the home.
Secure: In cases of process effecting individuals, this variable
refers to whether the police have placed the target of the process in
police custody, primarily indicating the individual has been
handcuffed. In the context of search warrants, this variable did not
apply and was automatically coded as secured.
Home: This variable identifies whether the contact between the
assailant and the victim-officer began at the home. A home is broadly
defined and includes, single and multifamily dwellings, apartment
houses and complexes, trailers, stationary or mobile, and motels. Cases
where the home is not identified, indicates that the execution of the
process was initiated at some other location, usually through street
observation.
Ambush: The term ambush was used on a very restricted basis.
An ambush required that the officer have no knowledge of the killer’s
whereabouts prior to the killing. The ambush must be the direct cause
of the killing; an ambush not resulting in fatal injury of police was not
included. LEOKA utilized the term ambush in the summary
descriptions; unfortunately, it did not appear that the use of the term
was governed by any form of definition or used consistently. This
research did not consider LEOKA’s use of the term “ambush” as an
indication that an actual ambush took place. There were significant
discrepancies between LEOKA’s use of the term and the use for this
research. As a general note, the definitions used in this research
resulted in a greater number of ambushes than those suggested by

118. All search warrant cases were coded as having no third party involvement.
119. Unattached structures included garages, sheds, etc.
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LEOKA.
Temporal Scope: The data utilized in the study were extracted
from years 1985 through 1995, totaling ten years of data. 120 Though
more current data is available, this temporal scope was utilized so the
before and after effects of Buie could be gauged. This encompassed
five years of data prior to Buie (1985-1990) and five years after Buie
(1990-1995). 121
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
This Part begins with a brief assessment of the total number of
police officers feloniously killed during the service or execution of
process. Next, it examines whether Buie caused a decrease in the
number of police officers killed during the execution or service of
process. 122 Each of the five variables discussed earlier is then
examined individually. 123 Part V then discusses the findings and
conclusions. 124
During the ten-year study period, there were sixty-eight incidents
in which seventy-six police officers were feloniously killed in the line
of duty while serving or executing any form of legal process. This
results in an annual average of 6.8 incidents and 7.6 police officers
being feloniously killed in the line of duty while engaged in the service
of process during the study period. It is very difficult to gauge the
dangerousness of this activity since it is unknown how often the police
engage in the service and execution of process.
The Buie decision was rendered in the earlier part of 1990. To
examine whether Buie affected the rate of felonious killings, officer
deaths involving service of process in homes were examined both
before and after Buie. Five years of data before the Buie decision and
five years of data after are included for analysis. Figure 1 illustrates
the observed changes in the number of police feloniously killed during
service process and execution.

120. The data was specifically extracted from February 28, 1985 to February 28, 1995.
These dates were selected to match the date of the Buie decisions release on February 28,
1990.
121. It is impossible to gauge whether Buie had an actual impact on police practices
governing protective sweeps, it was presumed for purposes of this research that police
practices and guidelines have followed the law as articulated by the Supreme Court.
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. See infra Part IV.B–E.
124. See infra Part V.
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Figure 1:

FATALITIES BEFORE/AFTER
BUIE
60
40

Fatal Incidents

20

Fatalities

0
Pre-Buie

Post-Buie

The differences between the before and after data for the felonious
killing of police officers is slight. Before Buie, there are thirty-three
incidents resulting in thirty-six felonious killings; after Buie there are
thirty-four incidents resulting in forty felonious killings. 125 The slight
increase in fatal incidents after Buie did not achieve statistical
significance (χ2 = .015, df = 1, p = .9028). 126 The slight differences
observed in the total number of officers killed also did not achieve
statistical significance (χ2 = .211, df = 1, p = .6464). 127 The first
analysis of the data, attempting to measure if the Buie decision resulted
in a decrease in the number of felonious killings during process service,
did not demonstrate any material alteration of the status quo. In fact, a
slight and non-significant increase was observed. Although no
observable changes were recorded, the finding is limited from a lack of
knowledge concerning any increases or decreases in process service
which may have occurred during the period.
A. Process Service
This section examines the felonious killings of police officer
125. The difference between the number of officers feloniously killed and the number of
incidents is due to the fact that more than one officer can be feloniously killed in one
incident.
126. The chi squared test statistic used in the analysis is one of the most commonly used
statistical tests for nominal level data. The p = .9028 value indicates that there is an over
90% probability that the observed differences were simply random and not caused by any
outside forces.
127. Arrest warrants only also failed to achieve statistical significance (χ2 = .235, df = 1,
p= .6278).
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during specific process service and execution. Figure 2 illustrates the
types of process service where felonious killings took place. 128
Figure 2:

TYPE OF PROCESS
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Of the seventy-six felonious killings, thirty-six—just over half—
occurred during the execution of an arrest warrant. This was followed
by the execution of search warrants, which account for twenty-one
felonious killings in twenty-one separate incidents. The service of
temporary restraining orders, involuntary commitment orders, and civil
process, account for only twelve—just under sixteen percent—of the
total felonious killings. Clearly, service of arrest warrants followed by
service of search warrants are the more dangerous police practices
based on the aggregate statistics. Unfortunately, aggregate statistics
cannot provide conclusive support that one particular activity is more
dangerous than another because of the absence of a base rate—amount
of time an officer spends on the activity—from which to compare. 129
Since the total number of arrest warrant executions is unknown, it is
impossible to know how dangerous a particular activity is in relation to
another activity. This data limitation applies to all other forms of
process service and also applies to comparisons between them.

128. Compare to base rate issue in Garner & Clemmer, supra note 63, with Lichtenberg
et al, supra note 65, and discussed earlier in this text, supra Part II.
129. Garner & Clemmer, supra, note 63.
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B. Home
The home was one of the more dangerous locations for the service
and execution of process. Sixty-five of the seventy-six incidents and
seventy-four of the eighty-five felonious killings took place at or
around the suspect’s home, a staggering eighty-seven percent. 130
While this certainly lends support to the Buie Court’s assumption that
in in-home warrant execution is more dangerous than on-the-street
encounters, it is again subject to the limitations of the absence of a base
rate. It is unknown how many warrants are executed at an individual’s
home versus on-the-street encounters.
Although the home, when broadly defined, appears dangerous, the
Buie Court used a more restrictive analysis of dangerousness than the
prior analysis. The prior analysis examined the actual or intended
service or execution of process in the suspect’s home. The Buie
Court’s analysis and the protective sweep doctrine actually apply to
being physically inside the home. Figure 3 breaks down the locations
of the fatal assaults by location.
Figure 3:
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When examined in more detail, inside the home remains
dangerous, but not as dangerous as the first analysis indicated. The
majority of the felonious killings of the police occurred prior to entry
into the home. Roughly sixty percent of the fatal incidents took place
outside the home prior to or during entry. Thus, of the seventy-six
incidents occurring during this time period, only thirty-one of the
incidents are within the framework of the protective sweep doctrine.
130. Search warrant related felonious killings were included in the analysis.
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C. Ambush
Ambushes in the service of process were not uncommon, though
short of being called a norm. Of the seventy-six fatal incidents, sixteen
were classified as ambushes, resulting in the deaths of sixteen of the
eighty-five police officers killed during the study period. 131 The Court
was very specific about ambushes in the Buie decision. 132 The Buie
Court specifically stated that “[a]n ambush in a confined setting of
unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more
familiar surroundings.” 133 To further test the Buie Court’s assumption,
the ambush cases are analyzed separately for the type of process being
served and the location of the ambush.
Of the sixteen incidents classified as ambushes, it appears that a
closer examination provides less support for the Buie Court’s
assumption. Only six of the sixteen ambushes occurred inside the
home, five occurred during a forced entry attempt to execute a search
warrant, three occurred at the entrance to the home, and two occurred
outside the home entirely. Another notable observation is the small
number of arrest warrant cases involving ambushes. Arrest warrants
account for forty-three of the eighty-five police officers slain during the
service of process—slightly more than fifty-percent. In the ambush
context, only four of the sixteen ambush incidents occurred during the
service of arrest warrants. It appears that an ambush occurring during
the execution of arrest warrants is a relatively rare occurrence.
Notably, search warrants account for eleven of the sixteen ambush
incidents, many occurred during a forced entry. It appears that
ambushes are more frequently related to search warrants, though they
do occur on occasion in the execution of arrest warrants. In addition,
of the fatal ambushes, only six, or 37.5%, occurred inside the home.
This provides limited support and perhaps even contradicts the Buie
Court’s assertion that ambushes within the home were to be feared
more. It appears that in most ambush situations the police have not
made entry into the home or are making initial entry.
D. Secured
In Buie, the Supreme Court was concerned that even after the
police secured the principle suspect, the dangers to the police officer
were not dispelled. 134 In this analysis, only one police officer was
131. This constitutes 18.8% of the felonious killings, roughly one in five of the fatalities
the result of an ambush.
132. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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fatally assaulted while the suspect was secure. In this case, it was
questionable whether the suspect was secure according to the
definition. The suspect was not handcuffed, but merely placed in the
rear of the patrol car, prior to the fatal assault. 135 Because this variable
is interrelated with the third party variable, further discussion will be
reserved for that section. It should also be noted that secured did not
apply to search warrant cases, which were not included in the analysis
of this variable.
E. Third Party
The crux of the Buie decision rested on the presence of unknown
third parties who might launch an attack against the police after the
arrest warrant has been executed and the targeted suspect secured.136
This assumption has some strange aspects surrounding it. In Buie, the
police conducted a protective sweep of the basement after they secured
Buie. 137 It seems odd that a third party would launch an attack after the
removal of the suspect. Why would an ambush against the police
occur if the person is already gone? Because the person undertaking
the ambush could not free the apprehended suspect if the ambush was
successful, there appears to be little that could be accomplished, other
than perhaps seeking revenge.
The troubled aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Buie directed at
third parties played out in the reality of the killings during the service
of process. No felonious killings of police officers were directly
attributable to third parties and only in two of the seventy-six incidents
was there any third party involvement at all. In one case a third party
thwarted the initial apprehension of the suspect, by interfering with the
officer’s arrest, the chase was then resumed, and the officer was later
slain by the person he was pursuing. Clearly, the third party did not
cause the death of the officer; in addition, at the time of the third party
involvement, the suspect was not in custody. 138 In the other case, the
three officers killed were serving an arrest warrant for a mother and son
and there were three sons present in the motel room where the slayings
occurred. The involvement of the two sons not targeted by the arrest
warrants is unclear. Even if the two sons were involved in the slayings
of the three officers, it does not fulfill the factual requirements of the
Buie decision as the two suspects targeted by the arrest warrants were

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Buie, 494 U.S., at 334.
Id. at 328.
Id.
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clearly not yet secured. 139
This analysis undercuts the crux of the Buie Court’s assumptions
regarding unknown third parties. Experience both before and after
Buie demonstrates that unknown third parties pose little threat to the
police when service or executing legal process at a suspect’s home.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Buie Court entertained a new expansion of the Terry
rationale, implicating an area significantly protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the home. 140 The Court applied a reasonable suspicion of
danger to the officer analysis as a justification for the protective sweep
of the home. 141 This was a significant expansion of the Terry
standard. 142
Until Buie, Terry and progeny were limited to suspicions
concerning known suspects who could be identified by the police.
Whether those suspicions were right or wrong was not the point; the
underlying principle of Terry was that the officer was able to articulate
specific grounds for the suspicion of a known person. 143 Buie
drastically altered the Terry rationale—rather than requiring the police
to justify why a particular person may present a threat to the officer or
others at a particular time, Buie permits police to suspect a person is
dangerous before the person even is known to exist. Buie also applied
to an area where the expectation of privacy was even greater, the
home. 144 Terry involved an on-the-street encounter 145 and Long
involved a motor vehicle stop. 146 In both situations, there is a lesser
expectation of privacy than in the home. Buie involved a protective
sweep of an individual’s home, thus allowing reasonable suspicion to
be applied to the area with the greatest expectation of privacy. The
Buie Court qualified this by limiting the protective sweep to places
where an individual might be hiding, but that limitation leaves little
outside the scope of the protective sweep. 147
In the traditional balancing test, the interests of the state are
weighed against those of the individual. 148 The stakes are high on both
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990).
Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 333.
Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335–36.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6–7.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035–36 (1983).
Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 332.
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sides of the debate. On the side of the state are the officer’s interest in
not being victimized and potentially losing his or her life to an ambush
or other third party attack. On the citizen’s side are the interests in not
having the privacy of the home invaded without a substantial state
justification.
This research undertook an empirical examination of the Buie
Court’s rationale to provide a better understanding of the scope of
police victimization during in-home warrant and other legal process
execution and service. In addition to examining the scope of
victimization, specific aspects of Buie’s underlying rationale were
examined empirically. This empirical study examined how police
officers are killed feloniously in the line of duty while executing arrest
warrants and other process.
The findings were that the felonious killing of a police officer
while serving legal process is an infrequent occurrence, an average of
7.6 officers per year. 149 Unfortunately, a danger ratio analysis is not
possible because the data simply does not provide a base rate from
which to compare, thus where the dangers of serving legal process falls
in relation to other police activity remains unknown.
In support of the Buie Court’s assumption was the finding that the
home was a particularly dangerous location. 150 Eighty-seven percent of
the officers feloniously killed while serving or executing process
occurred while attempting to serve or execute process at a home. This
supportive finding was limited by the fact that it is unknown how many
warrants are executed at the home compared to other locations, thus
making the computation of a danger ratio impossible. Although
ninety-one percent occurred in or around the home, the protective
sweep doctrine also is limited to within the home. When analyzed in
this context, the number of police killed inside the home was reduced
to less than half of the first analysis—approximately thirty-seven
percent.
Also supporting the Buie Court’s assumptions were the findings
concerning felonious killings by type of service. Arrest warrants
accounted for nearly fifty percent of the total felonious killings in the
study. This finding was again limited by the inability to apply a danger
ratio, as how often arrest warrants are served in comparison to other
types of service is unknown.
The findings on ambushes against the police in the service or
149. This is less than the average of 10 police feloniously killed per year during motor
vehicle stops observed in the Lichtenberg et al, see supra note 65, though this conclusion is
limited by the inability to apply Garner & Clemmer’s, see supra note 63, danger ratio.
150. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.
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execution of process were mixed. There were ambushes against the
police—slightly less than twenty percent—but much of this was
accounted for during search warrant execution, particularly knock and
announce situations. Arrest warrant service accounted for only a small
number of ambushes. There is limited data to support the Buie Court’s
contention concerning ambushes, but they are infrequent and usually
involve search warrants as opposed to arrest warrants.
In the context of an unknown third party launching an assault
against the police after the arrest warrant has been executed and the
suspect restrained, it appears that such attacks, if they occur at all, have
not been frequent enough or severe enough to result in the felonious
killing of a police officer. As discussed earlier, the crux of the Buie
decision rests on the assumption that unknown third parties are willing
to launch a potentially lethal attack against the police. 151 The attacks
by potential third parties simply did not occur as the Court believed
they might. Third parties were unwilling or unable to launch a fatal
assault against the police. The findings of this research conclusively
point out that the suspects willing to fatally assault the police are the
targets of the arrest warrant or other process, the people with the most
to lose. 152 This third party concept could not be applied to search
warrants and perhaps a more focused analysis of the dangers of search
warrant service would be helpful. Of course, the applicability of the
protective sweep doctrine to the execution of search warrants is also
unclear.
This research concludes that in a study of fatal assaults against the
police during a ten-year period, there was no evidence to support a
conclusion that unknown third parties present a serious threat to the
police. It should also be noted that, since Buie, circuit courts have been
split on the contentious issue of expanding the protective sweep
doctrine, particularly to situations in which the police gain entry into
the home through consent and then undertake a protective sweep. 153
Although this research did not specifically attempt to gauge the
dangerousness of this police practice, the findings should be considered
instructive for that purpose.
The findings of this research are limited in certain respects. The
absence of the danger ratio is perhaps the most significant limitation
and especially implicates the findings on the process, location, and
home variables. The secure and third party variables are not seriously
151. Id. at 334.
152. This finding does not necessarily apply to search warrants.
153. Jamie Ruf, Note, Expanding Protective Sweeps within the Home, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 143, 155–59 (2006).
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implicated by the absence of sufficient data to create a danger ratio.
This research has also relied on data that is now nearly twenty years
old and more current data is available for analysis. Finally, the data
was also extremely limited for its applicability to search warrant
execution and should be considered with great caution.
Future research on the dangers of police activities would benefit
greatly from data allowing the computation of a danger ratio. Also,
research independently focusing upon the dangers inherent to the
execution of search warrants would provide more instructive findings
concerning the execution of that form of process. Finally, research
using the most currently available data may be more useful for policy
and legal decision-making.
Even considering the limitations of this research and potential
benefits of a danger ratio and more current data, the dangers of third
parties to the police while serving or executing legal process were not
observed in this study. The findings of this research strongly suggest
that the Buie Court’s assumptions relied upon in justifying the
protective sweep doctrine were erroneous.

